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SNAP: HOW THE MORAL ELASTICITY OF THE
DENATURALIZATION STATUTE GOES TOO FAR
Aram A. Gavoor* and Daniel Miktus**
ABSTRACT
Comprehensive immigration reform is a popular topic in Congress. While many
reform bills have been offered, none have addressed the significant substantive and
procedural issues surrounding denaturalization, the process where the federal govern-
ment may seek to have a naturalized persons citizenship revoked in federal court if
his citizenshipwasunlawfullyor fraudulentlyprocured. Though denaturalization serves
public policy as a final check on naturalization fraud, existing law also permits the
government to denaturalize an individual solely for speech and expressive association
that occurs after one acquires citizenship. This provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c), violates
naturalized citizens First Amendment rights to free speech and association, interferes
with their Fifth Amendment right of equal protection, and also has a tendency to over-
penalize otherwise innocent conduct. Moreover, authority to initiate a denaturalization
proceeding is spread among the Attorney General and all U.S. Attorneys. Congress
has not codified an evidentiary burden for denaturalization since the process was ini-
tially enacted in 1906. To protect the constitutional rights of all U.S. citizens and to
provide legislative clarity, Congress should excise 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) from immigra-
tion law, vest sole authority to initiate denaturalization proceedings with the Attorney
General, and codify the clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidentiary burden.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1956, Anton Geiser immigrated to the United States, and in 1962 he success-
fully became a U.S. citizen.1 After living in the U.S. for the following forty-two years,
the United States government2 sought to revoke Geisers citizenship because he was
a guard at Nazi concentration camps when he was seventeen, and lied about it while
naturalizing.3 The government successfully revoked his citizenship in federal district
1 United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 290 (3d Cir. 2008).
2 All references to government refer to the United States government.
3 Geiser, 527 F.3d at 29091; Rich Lord, Board May Deport Former Nazi Guard Living
in Pennsylvania, PITT.POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 24, 2012), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories
/local/region/board-may-deport-former-nazi-guard-living-in-pennsylvania-663435/; see also
Anita Henkel Blumenstock, Note, Immigration LawVoluntary Assistance to the Enemy and
Assistance in Persecution as Alternative Grounds for Denaturalization of Suspected Nazi
War CriminalsUnited States v. Kowalchuk, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1291, 1302 (1986) ([T]he
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court and, in 2012, at the age of 88, Geiser died, still fighting proceedings to remove
him to Austria.4 Geiser was subjected to a civil denaturalization proceeding,5 which
Congress first created through passage of the Naturalization Act of 1906.6 In most
cases, and certainly in Geisers, denaturalization based on fraudulently or illegally ob-
tained citizenship serves public policy and is an important final check in the enforce-
ment of U.S. immigration laws.7 The Supreme Court has held that no alien has the
right to retain any immigration benefit that was fraudulently or illegally obtained.8
Now imagine if a naturalized citizen had her citizenship revoked, not based on
evidence of fraud or illegality while naturalizing, but solely based on group association
after becoming a citizen.9 A 1952 addition to the denaturalization provision, the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires the Department of Justice to institute
denaturalization proceedings against World War II criminals who have unjustly obtained
American citizenship.).
4 Geiser, 527 F.3d at 291; Former Nazi Concentration Camp Guard Fighting Deportation
From the U.S. Dies at Age 88, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 26, 2012 11:18 PM), http://www.dailymail
.co.uk/news/article-2253577/Anton-Geiser-Former-Nazi-Guard-fighting-deportation-US
-dies-88.html.
5 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012). Denaturalization is also referred to as revocation of
naturalization. Such terms will be used interchangeably in this Article. The process of denat-
uralization is a civil action brought by the United States government against an individual to
revoke the individuals citizenship and citizenship credentials, such as their certificate of natu-
ralization or U.S. passport. The process of denaturalization, the grounds upon which the U.S.
government may pursue denaturalization, and the historical context are all discussed in detail
later in this Paper.
6 The NaturalizationAct of1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 15, 34 Stat. 601; Michael Heyman,
Language and Silence: The Supreme Courts Search for the Meaning of American Denatu-
ralization Law, 5 GEO. IMMIGR.L.J. 409, 410 (1991) (United States citizens lose citizenship
through only two means: (1) voluntary expatriation and (2) denaturalization.).
7 See, e.g.,Geiser, 527 F.3d at 288; United Statesv. Friedrich, 402 F.3d 842 (8thCir. 2005);
United States v. Reimer, 356 F.3d 456 (2d Cir. 2004). In each of these cases, a naturalized
citizen had his citizenship revoked for assisting the Nazi government in its persecution of Jews
during the Holocaust. In Friedrich and Reimer, Eli Rosenbaum assisted in prosecuting the
defendants. For over 30 years, Rosenbaumhas been investigating and prosecuting individuals
believed to be Nazi war criminals. Andrea Fuller, As Old Nazis Die Off, Pursuit Goes On,
N.Y.TIMES (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/us/27nazi.html?_r=0. As of
2011, the Department of Justices Office of Special Investigations, which Rosenbaum headed
from 1995 through 2010, has succeeded in 107 cases against Nazi persecutors and has denied
admission to the United States to an additional 180 suspected Nazi persecutors. Detroit-Area
Man Who Shot Jews While Serving as Nazi Policeman Ordered Removed from the United
States, U.S. DEPT OF JUST., OFF. OF PUB. AFFS. (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa
/pr/2011/February/11-crm-142.html.
8 Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 673 (1946) (An alien has no moral nor
constitutional right to retain the privileges of citizenship if, by false evidence or the like, an im-
position has been practiced upon the court, without which the certificate of citizenship could
not and would not have been issued. (quoting Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227,
241 (1912))).
9 See United States v. Chruszczak, 127 F. Supp. 743, 747 (N.D. Ohio 1954).
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group association provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c), provides a statutory mechanism
for the government to revoke a naturalized persons citizenship solely on the basis of
actions taken after gaining his citizenship.10 This provision is a vestigial remnant of
McCarthyism11 and acts as a presumption of fraud or illegal procurement of natural-
ization solely on the basis of membership in, or association with, certain groups within
five years of naturalization. This Article will demonstrate how 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) fails
to provide a reliable check for enforcement, is facially unconstitutional, and serves
no important public policy.
Section 1451(c) remains relatively unnoticed by legislators of today, aside from
those well-versed in immigration law.12 Much of the denaturalization statute is anti-
quated, explaining why it has received little to no discussion by Congress since its cre-
ation in 1906 and revision in 1952.13 In fact, all recent comprehensive immigration
reform bills fail to address the subject of denaturalization, and the constitutional and
procedural defects of § 1451(c) in particular.14 Congress should recognize the fallacies
and shortcomings of the denaturalization statute when it ultimately passes immigra-
tion reform, and amend the statute to free it of its significant constitutional flaws and
longstandingprocedural defects. In doing so, Congress will encourage onlyappropriate
enforcement of the nations immigration laws and minimize the possibility of un-
scrupulous, unconstitutional use of those laws at the whims of bureaucratic fiat.
The denaturalization statute should be modified to: (1) eliminate the group
membership and association provision, § 1451(c), in its entirety; (2) consolidate sole
authority to the Attorney General to initiate denaturalization proceedings; and (3) cod-
ify the evidentiary burden required for denaturalization. First, the group association
10 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (2012).
11 Irving Louis Horowitz, Culture, Politics and McCarthyism: A Retrospective from the
Trenches, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 357, 365 (1996) (McCarthyism is another word for
intolerance backed by power.).
12 See, e.g., BorderSecurity, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
H.R. 15, 113thCong. (2013); Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Mod-
ernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013); Strengthen and Fortify Enforcement Act (SAFE
Act), H.R. 2278, 113th Cong. (2013); Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors
(DREAM) Act of 2011, S. 952, H.R. 1842, 112th Cong. (2011); Border Security Results Act,
H.R. 1417, 113th Cong. (2013); see also AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION
INFONET, http://www.aila.org/Issues/AllIssues.aspx (last visited Mar. 11, 2015) (failing to
name denaturalization as a Featured Topic); IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER: AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/issues (last visited Mar. 11,
2015) (failing to name denaturalization as one of the issues for reform).
13 Congress initiallycodifieddenaturalizationproceedingsinTheNaturalizationAct of1906,
Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 15, 34 Stat. 596, 601. Since then, this civil proceeding has been amended
by The Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 338, 54 Stat. 1137, 1158, and The Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 340, 66 Stat. 163, 260. It has not
seen significant revision since 1952. It is the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 in which
§ 340, or 8 U.S.C. § 1451, sets out the current statutory requirements for denaturalization.
14 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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provision provides that ones membership in a particular group defined by law within
five years after naturalizing establishes prima facie evidence that an individual should
have been precluded from naturalization from the start.15 Such a provision is danger-
ously at odds with the protections provided by the First and Fifth Amendments because
it proscribes protected expressive association and delineates classes of citizens based
on national origin. Second, the statutory split enforcement authority that empowers
both the U.S. AttorneyGeneral and ninety-four United States Attorneys to initiate de-
naturalization actions is superfluous and inefficient.16 Finally, as a measure of legisla-
tive clarity, Congress should codify the Supreme Courts stringent evidentiary standard
that naturalization will not be revoked without clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence.17 Both legislative and judicial history observe the common understanding
that denaturalization is a very significant action that potentially subjects individuals
to one of the harshest penalties imaginable.18 Congress should recognize the signifi-
cant and substantial consequences that may accompany any further failure to reform
this portion of U.S. immigration law.
This Article will first provide an overview of the denaturalization procedure to
provide important context on the statutory and judicial development of denaturaliza-
tion. Then, it will analyze the substantive and procedural areas where Congress should
take immediate action to amend the denaturalization statute.
I. DENATURALIZATION OVERVIEW
A. The Anatomy of a Denaturalization Action
Statutory authority to denaturalize is contained in the sweeping Immigration and
NationalityAct of 1952 (INA).19 The INA established the modern foundation for fed-
eral governance of most immigration issues.20 From this framework of immigration
legislation, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421 through 1450 provide the procedures and requirements
15 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (2012).
16 See infra Part II.B.1.
17 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943) (To set aside such a grant the
evidence must be clear, unequivocal, and convincingit cannot be done upon a bare pre-
ponderance of evidence which leaves the issue in doubt.).
18 See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505 (1981) ([T]he right to acquire
American citizenship is a precious one, and that once citizenship has been acquired, its loss can
have severe and unsettling consequences.); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950)
(Black, J., dissenting) (referring toUnited States citizenship as a priceless treasure); Klapprott
v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (To take away a mans
citizenship deprives him of a right no less precious than life or liberty . . . .).
19 8 U.S.C. §§ 11011537 (2012); see also Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct.
1968, 1973 (2011).
20 The Supreme Court stated that the INA established a comprehensive federal statutory
scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization and set the terms and conditions of
admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1973 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353, 359 (1976)).
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for the United States to confer citizenship to individuals not born in the United States
via the naturalization process.21 To successfullynaturalize, an individual must satisfy
enumerated procedural prerequisites, including but not limited to residency, limited
length of absence, and physical presence requirements.22 The INA provides substantive
requirements that individuals applying for naturalization possess good moral charac-
ter, be attached to the principles of the U.S. Constitution, and be well disposed to
the good order and happiness of the United States.23 The INA makes clear that appli-
cants should neither oppose our form of government nor pledge allegiance to totalitar-
ian regimes.24 The Supreme Court construes these requirements strictlyand militates
that [n]o alien has the slightest right to naturalization unless all statutory requirements
are complied with.25 Based on the language of the INA, each certificate of citizen-
ship provided to a naturalized citizen must be treated as granted upon condition that
the government may challenge it . . . and demand its cancellation unless issued in
accordance with such requirements.26
Aftercompletinganaturalizationapplication and successfullycompleting a review,
the individual may then take the oath and receive a certificate of naturalization.27 The
certificate of naturalization is said to confer all the rights and responsibilities of a
natural-born United States citizen.28 The Supreme Court has emphasized, on several
occasions, the importance of gaining United States citizenship and the significance of
any attempt to revoke ones citizenship.29 Although a newly naturalized citizen is
21 8 U.S.C. §§ 142150 (2012).
22 See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(c) (2012); see also United States v. Jean-Baptiste, 395 F.3d
1190, 1192 (11th Cir. 2005) (describing the naturalization requirements in 8 U.S.C. § 1427).
23 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a), (d) (2012).
24 Amy D. Ronner, Denaturalization and Death: What It Means to Preclude the Exercise
of Judicial Discretion, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 101, 109 (2005).
25 Fedorenko v. United States,449U.S. 490, 506 (1981) (quoting United Statesv. Ginsberg,
243 U.S. 472, 475 (1917)).
26 Id.
27 See Naturalization Oath of Allegiance to the United States of America, U.S.CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,http://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/naturalization-test/natural
ization-oath-allegiance-united-states-america; USCIS Form N-400, Application for Natural-
ization, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/n-400
.pdf; see also Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000) (The oath is an essen-
tial element in theprocessofbecominga naturalized citizen, conducted in a public ceremony.).
28 Gorbach, 219 F.3d at 1090 (describing the certificate as a finding by the United States
Attorney General that the individual has met the requirements and taken the oath of allegiance
and is now considered a United States citizen); see also Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22
(1913) (Under our Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on an equal footing with the native
citizen in all respects, save that of eligibility to the Presidency.). Some argue, however, that
taking the oath thereby confers the benefits of citizenship and the certificate is merely evidence
of those benefits. See 8 C.F.R. § 338.1(a) (2014) (When an applicant for naturalization has
taken and subscribed to the oath ofallegiance . . . USCIS will issue a Certificate ofNaturalization
at the conclusion of the oath administration ceremony.).
29 See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505 ([T]he right to acquire American citizenship is a
precious one, and that once citizenship has been acquired, its loss can have severe and unsettling
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purportedly conferred the same rights that a natural-born citizen holds,30 a naturalized
citizen doesnt really have the same rights because unlike a natural-born citizen, a
naturalized citizen can still be subject to having his citizenship revoked through a
denaturalization proceeding.31
Typically, denaturalization is initiated as a civil proceeding that may be brought
bya United States Attorney.32 A complaint must assert that a naturalized citizens cer-
tificate of naturalization was illegally procured or procured through concealment
of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.33 An accompanying affidavit sat-
isfies the procedural prerequisite of showing good cause for the United States to
bring such a proceeding.34 The government faces a high evidentiary burden to revoke
an individuals citizenship. The Supreme Court requires that the government provide
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that naturalization was obtained through
illegal means, concealment of a material fact, or willful misrepresentation.35 With
regard to the illegally procured ground for denaturalization under § 1451(a), the
Supreme Court has held that there must be strict compliance with all the congression-
ally imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship.36 If any of the conditions
are not completed or complied with, the certificate was procured by illegal means and
consequences.); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting)
(referring to United States citizenship as a priceless treasure); Klapprott v. United States,
335 U.S. 601, 616 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring in result) (To take away a mans citi-
zenship deprives him of a right no less precious than life or liberty . . . .); Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122, 125 (1943).
30 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
31 See 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012).
32 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012). Although rarelyused, denaturalization mayalso be initiated as
a criminal proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. § 1425 (2012).
33 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) states:
It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for the respective
districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute pro-
ceedings in any district court of the United States in the judicial district
in which the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing suit,
for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such
person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of naturalization on
the ground that such order and certificate of naturalization were ille-
gally procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by
willful misrepresentation . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012); see also Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 767 (1988)
(holding that in a § 1451(a) denaturalization proceeding initiated because the individual mis-
represented information during the naturalization process, he must have done so in a willful
and material way).
34 United States v. Zucca, 351 U.S. 91, 99 (1956).
35 Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505 (1981) (citing Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943)).
36 Id. at 506.
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revocation becomes possible.37 If the burden is met, the court must enter an order
revoking the naturalization order and canceling the certificate of naturalization
courts lack equitable discretion to refrain from entering a judgment of denaturalization
against a naturalized citizen whose citizenship was procured illegally or by willful
misrepresentation of material facts.38
The Supreme Courts last foray into denaturalization was in 1988 when it decided
Kungys v. United States.39 In Kungys, the Court elaborated on the evidence requisite
to establish willful and material fraud.40 The Court established four requirements that
the government must satisfy to revoke ones naturalization: the naturalized citizen
musthavemisrepresented or concealed some fact, the misrepresentation or concealment
must have been willful, the fact must have been material, and the naturalized citizen
must have procured citizenship as a result of the misrepresentation or concealment.41
Further interpreting the four independent requirements, the Court defined the term
material to include a misrepresentation that had a natural tendency to influence the
decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.42 The Court further noted that
the phrase procured by in the fourth requirement requires something more than the
applicants misrepresentation of something in the application proceeding.43
A significant section of the denaturalization statute, and the main focus of this
Article, is 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c). This section provides that membership in, or association
with, certain groups during a five-year period after the individual naturalizes consti-
tutes prima facie evidence that an individual was not attached to the principles of the
U.S. Constitution at the time of naturalization.44 Under § 1451(c), membership in
37 See id. (holding that naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be set aside); see
also U.S. IMMIGRATIONAND NATURALIZATIONSERV.,REVOCATION OFCITIZENSHIP:MEMORAN-
DUM OPINION FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
(Mar. 3, 1997), available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=742439.
38 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 517.
39 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
40 Id. at 767.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 772. The Immigrationand NaturalizationServiceresponsibilitiesarenowtransferred
to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services of theUnited StatesDepartmentofHome-
land Security under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 101.
43 Kungys, 485 U.S. at 773, 777 (suggesting that [p]roof of materiality can sometimes be
regarded as establishing a rebuttable presumption, but [p]rocurement of other benefits, includ-
ing visas, is not covered.).
44 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) provides:
If a person who shall have been naturalized . . . shall within five years
next following such naturalization become a member of or affiliated with
any organization, membership in or affiliation with which at the time of
naturalization would have precluded such person from naturalization
under the provisions of section 1424 of this title, it shall be considered
prima facie evidence that such person was not attached to the principles
of the Constitution of the United States and was not well disposed to the
good orderand happinessof the United States at the timeofnaturalization,
2015] SNAP: THE MORAL ELASTICITY 645
defined groups after gaining citizenship, on its own, is sufficient evidence to revoke a
naturalized citizens certificate of naturalization.45 The history of denaturalization pro-
ceedings based on group membership begins with individuals known for communist
or Nazi ties.46 Section 1451(c) cross-references to 8 U.S.C. § 1424, which provides
the statutory framework for how the government determines which organizations
will preclude an individual from eligibility for citizenship.47 Section 1424 includes
a specific provision that prohibits naturalization for individuals affiliated with the
Communist Party.48
Other portions of the denaturalization statute provide further procedural require-
ments for denaturalization proceedings. Section 1451(b) requires the government to
provide sixty days personal notice to an individual it plans to denaturalize, and gives
the individual time to respond to the governments future complaint in U.S. district
court.49 Section 1451(f) provides that, upon the district courts cancellation of an
individuals certificate of naturalization, the court will send the order to the Attorney
General and the denaturalized individual must return his certificate of naturalization
and, in the absence of countervailing evidence, it shall be sufficient in
the proper proceeding to authorize the revocation and setting aside of
the order admitting such person to citizenship and the cancellation of the
certificate of naturalization as having been obtained by concealment of
a material fact or by willful misrepresentation . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (2012); see also Charles R. Hooker, The Past as Prologue: Schneiderman
v. United States and Contemporary Questions of Citizenship and Denaturalization, 19
EMORY INTLL.REV. 305, 362 (2005) (Section 1451(c) allows the government to make out
a prima facie case of non-attachment when a person becomes a member of certain organiza-
tions within five years of naturalization.).
45 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (2012).
46 See Hooker, supra note 44, at 36364; see also RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON
IMMIGRATION LAW § 1:2 (2014) (The Immigration and Nationality Act, and others enacted
in the same time period, reflected the times, and particularly incorporated the fear and threat
of Communism.).
47 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1424, 1451(c) (2012).
48 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a)(2) provides that no individual may be naturalized:
who is a member of or affiliated with (A) the Communist Party of the
United States; (B) any other totalitarian party of the United States; (C) the
Communist Political Association; (D) the Communist or other totalitar-
ian party of any State of the United States, of any foreign state, or of any
political or geographical subdivision of any foreign state; (E) anysection,
subsidiary, branch, affiliate, or subdivision of any such association or
party; or (F) the direct predecessors or successors of any such associa-
tion or party . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1424(a)(2) (2012).
49 8 U.S.C. § 1451(b) (2012). The Civil Justice ReformAct also requires each district court
to devise a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan, in which the presiding judicial
officer provides the naturalized citizen notice and an opportunity to settle, with certain excep-
tions, before a complaint is filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (2012). See generally 28 U.S.C.
§§ 47182 (2012).
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to the AttorneyGeneral.50 Additionally, § 1451(d) contains provisions regarding how
derivative citizens who obtained their naturalization via a relationship with a denatural-
ized individual are treated.51 Also, as a general catchall, § 1451(h) permits the Attorney
General to correct, reopen, alter, modify, or vacate an order naturalizing the person.52
This provision gives the Attorney General the ability to pursue denaturalization with-
out any statute of limitations on when the case can be brought.53 Such prosecutorial
freedom allows the federal government to pursue denaturalization many years after
a person was admitted as a United States citizen.54 After denaturalization, an individual
reverts to the previous status he held, usually lawful permanent resident, and the fed-
eral government can determine if removal is necessary.55
The larger statutory scheme of the INA provides further context and definitions to
regulate the denaturalization process. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6), an individual shall
not be considered to have good moral character if the individual has given false testi-
mony for the purpose of obtaining any [immigration] benefits.56 The Supreme Court
further elaborated that § 1101(f)(6) does not distinguish between material and imma-
terial misrepresentation.57 Section 1101(f)(9) provides that an individual will not be
found to have good moral character for taking part in Nazi persecution, participation
in genocide, or commission of acts of torture or extrajudicial killings.58 Section 1101
provides the definitions for good moral character within the denaturalization statute,
and the government uses such definitions to create affidavits of good cause arguing that
an individual was not fit for naturalization.59
50 8 U.S.C. § 1451(f) (2012).
51 8 U.S.C. § 1451(d) (2012). This provision was later held to only affect derivatives who
claimed citizenship through an individual denaturalized for actual fraud. See Developments
in the LawImmigration and Nationality, 66 HARV.L.REV. 643, 730 (1953) (In interpreting this
provision so as to reduce the number of derivatives losing citizenship courts held that actual
fraud did not include the constructive fraud resulting from a consent judgment. The 1952 Act
also invalidates rights of derivatives who claim through persons denaturalized for actual fraud
now concealment or willful misrepresentation.(footnote omitted)).
52 8 U.S.C. § 1451(h) (2012).
53 See Sherry L. Brever, Comment, Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals: Is There
Sufficient Justice for Those Who Would Not Dispense Justice?, 40 MD.L.REV. 39, 73 (1981)
(There is no statute of limitations attached to the denaturalization statute, and the courts have
uniformly rejected laches as a defense. (footnote omitted)).
54 See, e.g.,United Statesv.Geiser,527 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2008) (describingdenaturalization
ofan individual with formerNazi ties forty-two yearsafterheobtains citizenship); Brever, supra
note 53, at 7374.
55 See Brever, supra note53,at50.As anexample, the government could pursuedeportation
proceedings if the individual obtained entryand permanent residence through illegal or fraudu-
lent means. Deportation and removal are used interchangeably; removal is the current stat-
utory term, which replaced the term deportation.
56 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (2012).
57 Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 779 (1988) (On its face, § 1101(f)(6) does not
distinguish between material and immaterial misrepresentations.).
58 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(9) (2012).
59 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f), 1451(a) (2012).
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Most denaturalization actions are filed as a civil action under 8 U.S.C. § 1451,60 but
criminal proceedings are also available under 18 U.S.C. § 1425.61 Section 1425 pro-
vides the federal government with permission to pursue criminal sanctions against an
individual that obtains naturalization illegally.62 If a person is convicted under the crim-
inal statute, the court in which such conviction is had shall thereupon revoke . . .
the final order admitting such person to citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e).63 Again,
significance is placed on Congress removal of judicial discretion in submitting the
final orders. A court must revoke the citizenship of an individual convicted under
18 U.S.C. § 1424.64 These few federal statutes govern the entire denaturalization pro-
cess, but it was the original codification of the process in 1906 that made the current
procedures possible.65
B. Legislative History Analysis
Before Congress enacted standards for naturalization, common law methods
existed for alien-immigrants to obtain citizenship. Prior to 1906, courts generally
mandated an individual satisfy four requirements to procure naturalization.66 First, an
alien would take an oath declaring the aliens bona fide intent to become a citizen and
renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign sovereignty.67 Second, the
alien needed to wait two years between making the oath and applying for citizenship.68
Third, the alien would need to satisfy four criteriaa minimum five-year residence in
60 8 U.S.C. § 1451(2) (2012).
61 8 U.S.C. § 1425 (2012).
62 8 U.S.C. § 1425 makes it a federal crime for:
(a) Whoever knowinglyprocures or attempts to procure, contrary to law,
the naturalization ofany person, or documentaryor other evidence of nat-
uralization or of citizenship; or
(b) Whoever, whether for himself or another person not entitled thereto,
knowinglyissues, procuresor obtains or applies for or otherwise attempts
to procureorobtainnaturalization, or citizenship, or a declarationof inten-
tion to become a citizen, or a certificate of arrival or any certificate or
evidence of nationalization or citizenship, documentary or otherwise, or
duplicates or copies of any of the foregoing . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1425(a)(b) (2012). For an example application of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), see United
States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2009).
63 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e) (leading to cancellation of the naturalization certificate according to
the procedures of § 1451(f)).
64 See id. (When a person shall be convicted under section 1425 of Title 18 . . . the court in
which such conviction is had shall thereupon revoke, set aside, and declare void the final order
admitting such person to citizenship, and shall declare the certificate of naturalization of such
person to be canceled. (emphasis added)).
65 Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 15, 34 Stat. 596, 601.
66 Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 2223 (1913).
67 Id. at 23.
68 Id.
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the United States, good moral character during that time period, attachment to the
principles of the Constitution of the United States, and being well disposed to the
good order and happiness of the U.S. Constitution.69 Finally, the alien would take
another oath to support the Constitution of the United States and absolutely and en-
tirely renounce all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign sovereignty.70 Courts de-
veloped these requirements over time, with little regulation byCongress prior to 1906.71
Similarly, before Congress codified any statutory procedures for denaturalization,
naturalized citizens could have their citizenship revoked. [F]ederal courts granted bills
in equity introduced by the Government to vacate naturalization judgments procured
by fraud.72
The introduction of statutory denaturalization legislation came during a time when
President Theodore Roosevelt was responding to a flawed immigration system full
of abuses and lacking any real safeguards.73 As early as 1844, members of the United
States Senate inquired into how they could legislate a legal method for revoking
citizenship.74 Over time, the President and others directed Congresss attention to the
need for a legislative effort to create formalized denaturalization proceedings.75 The
effort was intended to create a uniform system of naturalization and provide uniform
fairness to individuals seeking to naturalize.76 Between 1903 and 1904, President
Roosevelt called for the immediate attention of the Congress, and for a compre-
hensive revision of the naturalization laws.77 In March 1905, Roosevelt appointed
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 See REPORT OF THE NATURALIZATION COMMISSION TO THE PRESIDENT, H.R. REP.
NO. 59-46, at 19 (1905) (regarding thenaturalization process of the judicial systemat the time,
the Commission suggested to the President and Congress that the wisest course is to regulate
it and not destroy it).
72 Developments in the Law Immigration and Nationality, supra note 51, at 717 (This
power was deemed inherent in equity, and since citizenship was considered a public grant,
naturalization judgments could be set aside without regard to laches or estoppel.); see also
United States v. Norsch, 42 F. 417 (E.D. Mo. 1890) (The right of the United States to sue for
the cancellation of a certificate of decree of naturalization that has been obtained by fraud is
probablyco-extensive with the right nowaccorded the United States to sue for thecancellation
of patents that have been fraudulently procured.).
73 See Bindczyck v. Finucane, 342 U.S. 76, 7980 (1951); H.R. REP. NO. 59-46, supra
note 71, at 1113 (suggesting that motives of fraud included political parties trying to collect
morevotes, individuals attempting to gain employment of jobs that required U.S.citizenship, and
the ability to travel internationally with U.S. citizen credentials).
74 Bindczyck, 342 U.S. at 79 n.3 (citing S.J. Res., 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, 44 (1844)).
75 Id.
76 H.R. REP. NO. 59-46, supra note 71, at 19, 23.
77 Theodore Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1904), available at http://www
.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29545 (The courts having power to naturalize should be
definitely named by national authority; the testimony upon which naturalization may be con-
ferred should be definitely prescribed; publication of impending naturalization applications
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a commission to further investigate this proposal, and [t]he Purdy Commission de-
livered its report on November 8, 1905.78 The investigation determined the incidence
and causes of naturalization frauds and became the basis for the 1906 Naturalization
Act.79 The Naturalization Act of 1906 created the first statutory mechanism for de-
naturalization.80
1. The Naturalization Act of 1906
The newly enacted Naturalization Act of 1906 (1906 Naturalization Act) was
the culmination of half a centurys agitation directed at naturalization frauds, particu-
larly in their bearing upon the suffrage.81 The 1906 Naturalization Acts validity under
the Constitution is founded on the right of Congress [t]o establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization.82 It was formally titled An Act to Establish a Bureau of Immigration
and Naturalization, and to Provide for a Uniform Rule for the Naturalization of Aliens
Throughout the United States.83 With regard to denaturalization, § 15 of the 1906
Naturalization Act provided the authority to United States district attorneys upon
affidavit showing good cause therefore, to institute proceedings . . . for the purpose
of setting aside and canceling the certificate of citizenship on the ground of fraud
or illegal procurement.84 United States district attorneys now held authority to petition
courts for orders of denaturalization.85 In Johannessen v. United States,86 the Supreme
should be required in advance of their hearing in court; the formand wording of all certificates
issued should be uniform throughout the country, and the courts should be required to make
returns to the Secretary of State at stated periods of all naturalizations conferred.); Theodore
Roosevelt, Third Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1903), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29544#axzz1iuWhfMV1.
78 PATRICK WEIL, THE SOVEREIGN CITIZEN: DENATURALIZATION AND THE ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 17 (2013).
79 Bindczyck, 342 U.S. at 7980; WEIL, supra note 78, at 17.
80 WEIL, supra note 78, at 17.
81 Bindczyck, 342 U.S. at 79, 82 ([T]he history of the Act of 1906 makes clear that elections
could be influenced by irregular denaturalizations as well as by fraudulent naturalizations.).
82 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
83 Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 596.
84 Id. at § 15; Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087, 10991100 (9th Cir. 2000) (Thomas, C.J.,
concurring) (The 1906 Act instituted the judicial denaturalization procedure that remains sub-
stantially intact to this day: the appropriate United States Attorney files a civil complaint upon
affidavit showing good cause therefore.).
85 Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 15, 34 Stat. 596;
Gorbach, 219 F.3d at 1100 (Thomas, C.J., concurring) (stating that the 1906 Naturalization
Acts main framework for denaturalization proceedings remains substantially intact to this
day); see also Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 133 (1943) ([T]here is something
to be said for the proposition that the 1906 Act created a purely objective qualification, limiting
inquiry to an applicants previous conduct.).
86 225 U.S. 227 (1912).
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Court explained the provisions authorizing statutory denaturalization, stating that [a]n
alien has no moral nor constitutional right to retain the privileges of citizenship if, by
false evidence or the like, an imposition has been practiced upon the court, without
which the certificate of citizenship could not and would not have been issued.87
In Schneiderman v. United States,88 theSupremeCourt held that the 1906 Naturali-
zation Acts oath requirement did not require the applicant to swear that he was at-
tached to the Constitution, but only that he would support it.89 Additionally, the 1906
Naturalization Act for the first time imported the test of present belief into the natu-
ralization laws when it provided in § 7 that disbelievers in organized government and
polygamists could not become citizens.90 In another decision, Bindczyck v. Finucane,91
the Court posited that Congress formulated a self-contained, exclusive procedure
for denaturalization for fraud or illegal procurement.92
Finally, [t]o prevent fraud in a proceeding before a naturalization court, the 1906
Naturalization Act established a waiting period between filing an application for nat-
uralization and a final decision.93 The new 90-day waiting period provided time for the
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization to receive notice and intervene if necessary
after investigation.94 Congress provided the United States government with the author-
ity to appear at a naturalization hearing, cross-examine the witnesses for the individual
seeking naturalization, and produce its own evidence.95 The Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that Congress recognized that enforcement is the heart of the law.96
2. The Nationality Act of 1940
Congress expanded its role in legislating on the issue of immigration through
passage of the Nationality Act of 1940 (1940 Nationality Act).97 Section 338 of
the 1940 Nationality Act specifically included language regarding denaturalization
87 Id. at 241.
88 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
89 Id. at 133 n.12. But see Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338,
34 Stat. 596, 60304 (1906) (I am attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United
States.).
90 Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 134 n.12.
91 342 U.S. 76 (1951).
92 Id. at 83.
93 Id. at 80.
94 Id. at 8081.
95 Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 11, 34 Stat. 596; see
also Bindczyck, 342 U.S. at 80 (stating that § 11 was a scheme of administrative oversight).
96 Bindczyck, 342 U.S. at 81.
97 NationalityActof1940,Pub.L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137. The SupremeCourt has clearly
stated that the federal government has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration
and the status of aliens. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012).
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proceedings.98 According to the Supreme Court, § 338 reenacted § 15 of the 1906
Naturalization Act.99
Although the overall denaturalization procedures remained relatively intact,
Congress made some modifications. One change was the behavior requirement for nat-
uralization such that [n]o person . . . shall be naturalized unless [he] . . . has been and
still is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution
of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United
States.100 Part of the impetus for including behavior requirements was the rise in com-
munist fears during the time. Legislative history includes multiple bills suggesting that
Congress added communist beliefs as a restriction to prevent communist or Nazi sup-
porters from naturalizing.101 In Schneiderman, the Supreme Court stated that, while
the 1940 Nationality Act expanded the range of beliefs disqualifying persons from
gaining United States citizenship, Congress did not explicitly add communist beliefs
or affiliation as reasons to deny citizenship.102
Section 338 of The 1940 Nationality Act reaffirmed Congresss support of denat-
uralization proceedings. Congressional committee reports lacked any real mention of
98 Section 338 of the Nationality Act of 1940 states:
(a) It shall be the duty of the United States district attorneys for the
respective districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to insti-
tute proceedings in any court specified in subsection (a) of section 301
in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may reside at the
time of bringing suit, for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the
order admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the certificate
of naturalization on the ground of fraud or on the ground that such order
and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured.
(b) Thepartyto whomwas granted thenaturalization alleged to have been
fraudulently or illegally procured shall, in any such proceedings under
subsection (a) of this section, have sixty days personal notice in which
to make answer to the petition of the United States; and if such natural-
ized person be absent fromthe United States or from the judicial district
in which such person last had his residence, such notice shall be given
by publication in the manner provided for the service of summons by
publication or upon absentees by the laws of the State or the place where
such suit is brought.
Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 115859.
99 Bindczyck, 342 U.S. at 79. (Section 338 of the Nationality Act of 1940 is for our purpose
the reenactment of § 15 of the Act of June 29, 1906 . . . .).
100 The Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137, 1142; see Schneiderman
v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 133 n.12 (1943).
101 See, e.g., H.R.REP.NO. 72-1353 (1932); S.REP.72-808 (1932); H.R. REP.NO.74-1023
(1935); see also Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 132 n.8 (Bills to write a definition of communist
into the Immigration and Deportation Act of 1918 as amended . . . and to provide for the depor-
tation of communists failed to pass Congress in 1932 and again in 1935.).
102 Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 132 n.8.
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denaturalization and most changes were not regarded as a change in substance.103
Nonetheless, the 1940 Nationality Act reinforced the ability of the United States gov-
ernment to revoke an order admitting an individual to citizenship because it was ob-
tained through fraud or otherwise illegally procured.104
3. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952105 (INA) contains the current frame-
work for a denaturalization proceeding. Since enactment of the INA, the Supreme
Court has shaped denaturalization proceedings in a number of cases.106 In De Canas
v. Bica, the Court held that the [p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably
exclusively a federal power, and the states possess no role in its regulation.107 In
attaining naturalization under the law, the Court concluded that there must be strict
compliance with all the congressionally imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of
citizenship.108 Failure to comply with any of these conditions renders the certificate
of citizenship illegally procured, and naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be
set aside.109 Even with this constitutionallyprescribed power, however, the Court has
found that the right to acquire American citizenship is a precious one, and that once
citizenship has been acquired, its loss can have severe and unsettling consequences.110
Aware of these two considerations, the precious right of citizenship and the need
to prevent fraudulentlyprocured citizenship, Congress modified the denaturalization
procedure in the INA. In earlier immigration legislation, a judgment of denaturaliza-
tion could be secured only upon a finding that the naturalization decree was obtained
by fraud or illegal procurement.111 The INA made denaturalization possible if such
benefit was illegally procured or procured by concealment of a material fact or by
103 Id. at 133 n.12.
104 Bindczyck, 342 U.S. at 7778.
105 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 26972.
106 See, e.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988); Fedorenko v. United States,
449 U.S. 490 (1981); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
107 424 U.S. at 354, revd on other grounds; see also Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,
131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974 (2011) (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354); Chy Lung v. Freeman,
92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and
subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States.).
108 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 505; see also Vinineath Nuon Gopal, Comment, From Judicial to Administrative
Denaturalization: For Better or For Worse?, 72 U.COLO.L.REV. 779, 784 (2001) ([C]itizen-
ship is a precious right not to be taken (or taken away) lightly.); Catherine Yonsoo Kim, Note,
Revoking Your Citizenship: Minimizing the Likelihood of Administrative Error, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 1448, 1467 (2001) (The right to citizenship . . . provides the foundation from which
other rights arise.).
111 Developments in the Law Immigration and Nationality, supra note 51, at 719.
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willful misrepresentation.112 This change was significantpreviously a simple fraud
was sufficient to warrant denaturalizationas the INA required a more specific find-
ing of willful and material fraud.113 Prior to enactment of the INA, fraud could be found
and naturalization cancelled if an individual had mere procedural defects in his
application.114 The legislative history confirms that these changes were a deliberate at-
tempt to move from a simple fraud standard to the more specific willful and material
fraud standard.115 Accordingly, the government faced a higher evidentiary burden for
proving fraud by having to show willful and material misrepresentations where in the
past the Government could avoid having to prove difficult issues of intent by bring-
ing suit based on illegal procurement grounds.116
Ultimately, the INAs language provided for denaturalization through § 340(a)
(currently 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)) as well as the savings clause in § 340(j) (current
amended version codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1451(h)) that allowed courts to correct,
reopen, alter, modify, or vacate an order naturalizing such person.117 Section 1451(j)
acted as a savings clause for judges in that it provided judicial authority to denatural-
ize a naturalized citizen.118 If new evidence was brought forward, the judge could de-
termine if reconsideration was warranted.119 Congresss initial addition of the savings
clause in § 340(j) focused on what Congress perceived as the pre-existing power of
courts over their own judgments.120 However, the § 340(j) savings clause was edited
in the Immigration Act of 1990, giving that power to the Attorney General.121 The
changes were an attempt to preserve the pre-existing general authority of an agency
to modify its own issued order.122 No significant changes have been made to the de-
naturalization statute since, although some attempts have been made by members of
Congress to add other categories to the list of prohibited group membership.123
112 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a); Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 493.
113 See Developments in the Law Immigration and Nationality, supra note 51, at 720.
114 Id.
115 H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, 1740, 1741 (1952) (The bill changes the basis for judicial
revocation of naturalization from fraud and illegal procurement to procurement by conceal-
ment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.).
116 Brever, supra note 53, at 54 n.50.
117 8 U.S.C. § 340(a), (j) (currently8 U.S.C.§1451(a), (h));Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087,
110001 (9th Cir. 2000) (Thomas, C.J., concurring).
118 See Gorbach, 219 F.3d at 110001 (Thomas, C.J., concurring).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1101.
121 Immigration Actof1990,Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, § 18(d); see also Gorbach,
219 F.3d at 1101 (Thomas, C.J., concurring) (The 1990 Act retained § 340(a), but repealed
the saving clause at § 340(j) (redesignated § 340(i) in 1988). No new denaturalization power
or procedure was created. Thus, denaturalization procedure reverted to its pre-1952 state.).
122 Gorbach, 219 F.3d at 110102 (Thomas, C.J., concurring).
123 Hooker, supra note 44, at 310 (In September 2002, a group of twenty-five Republicans
in the House of Representatives introduced a bill containing provisions to allowthe government
to strip citizenship from persons for becoming a member of, or taking any action at the behest
of, a foreign terrorist organization.).
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In the 1960s, the Supreme Court expressed doubt regarding the constitutionality
of denaturalization.124 In Afroyim v. Rusk, the Supreme Court seemed to indicate that
theFourteenthAmendment precluded the federal government fromcancellinganatural-
ized individuals citizenship, stating that the Amendment can most reasonably be read
as defining a citizenship which a citizen keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it.
Once acquired, this Fourteenth Amendment citizenship was not to be shifted, can-
celed, or diluted at the will of the Federal Government, the States, or any other gov-
ernmental unit.125 However, the Supreme Court later read the holding of Afroyim
narrowly, insisting that this is not the case when citizenship was obtained illegally or
by willful misrepresentation.126
In Fedorenko v. United States, the Court explicitly held that district courts lack
equitable discretion to refrain from entering a judgment of denaturalization against a
naturalized citizen whose citizenship was procured illegally or by willful misrepresen-
tation of material facts.127 Accordingly, obtaining citizenship illegally or by willful
misrepresentation appears tobe theonlygroundsuponwhichnaturalization mayconsti-
tutionally be cancelled. Considering that the bulk of denaturalization after 1909 . . .
occurred out of a desire to expel . . . un-American citizens or those considered to be
behaving in un-American ways based on what they had done after naturalization,
manydenaturalization actions mayactuallyhave been carried out unconstitutionally.128
This is precisely the case if the government seeks denaturalization under § 1451(c)
based solely on actions taken after naturalization that have no bearing on whether that
individual engaged in unlawful or fraudulent conduct during the naturalization process.
II. AREAS FOR AMENDMENT OF THE DENATURALIZATION STATUTE
Americans generally believe that immigration reform is one of the most pressing
issues of our time.129 Congress and the President have acknowledged that comprehen-
sive immigration reform remains a top priority,130 and on August 1, 2014, the U.S.
House of Representatives sought to pass immigration legislation.131
124 See generally Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
125 Id. at 262.
126 See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981); see also Rogers v. Bellei, 401
U.S. 815 (1971).
127 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 517.
128 WEIL, supra note 78, at 52.
129 See Sheldon G. Adelson et. al., Break the Immigration Impasse, N.Y. TIMES (July 10,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/opinion/sheldon-adelson-warren-buffett-and
-bill-gates-on-immigration-reform.html?_r=0.
130 Obama Taunts Scared Republicans, Says Immigration Reform is a Priority, WASH.
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/14/obama-says-immi
gration-reform-still-priority-2014/?page=all.
131 Congress, Unhinged on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes
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While much attention regarding immigration reform focuses on issues such as
border security and how to properly handle the 11 million undocumented aliens cur-
rently residing in the U.S.,132 Congress must also take care not to overlook other por-
tions of the current immigration law that drastically need reformation. Specifically,
Congress should: (1) eliminate the group membership and association provision be-
cause it is facially unconstitutional under the First and Fifth Amendments; (2) vest sole
authority to initiate denaturalization proceedings to the Attorney General; and (3) cod-
ify the evidentiary standard of denaturalization. While not discussed as frequently as
other aspects of U.S. immigration law, these areas are in just as much need for reform,
and failure to amend these sections will lead to a lack of clarity regarding the law, and
potentially flagrant constitutional violations by a future administration or a reckless
civil servant.133
A. Congress Should Eliminate 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) in its Entirety Because it Is
Facially Unconstitutional and it Over-Penalizes Innocent Conduct
8 U.S.C. § 1451(c), the group membership and association provision of the
denaturalization statute, violates the First Amendments protection of expressive asso-
ciation and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendments Due Process
Clause.134 Additionally, § 1451(c) over-penalizes innocent conduct, and therefore
bears a striking resemblance to criminal laws that overcriminalize harmless conduct.
For these reasons, Congress should eliminate 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) from the denatu-
ralization law.
1. Section 1451(c) Violates the First Amendments Guarantees of Freedom of
Speech and Expressive Association
Section 1451(c) was enacted many years prior to NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson,135 the first Supreme Court case holding that the First Amendment protects
freedom of expressive association.136 Section 1451(c) tramples on the holding of
.com/2014/08/02/opinion/congress-unhinged-on-immigration.html. Within the past fewyears,
Congress has tried repeatedly to pass immigration reform. See, e.g., supra note 12.
132 Congress, Unhinged on Immigration, supra note 131.
133 The Justice Department does not currently use § 1451(c) as a basis to denaturalize
individuals. However, some believe that Congress may at some point amend that section to tar-
get members of groups currently considered unlawful, dangerous, or immoral. See Hooker,
supra note 44, at 376 (suggesting that War on Terror proponents will likely propose . . . to
make membership in terrorist organizations prima facie evidence of non-attachment to the
Constitution under § 1451(c)).
134 U.S. CONST. amends. I, V.
135 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
136 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (enacted in 1952), with Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(decided in 1958). The Supreme Court later added to its expressive association jurisprudence.
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NAACP and other SupremeCourt cases regardingexpressive association. Byproviding
that a naturalized individual may be denaturalized merely for associating with a par-
ticular group or for espousing a certain viewpoint within five years after he naturalizes,
8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) unconstitutionallydeprives newlynaturalized citizensofprotections
guaranteed by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
United States citizens have the basic right to freedom of speech and expressive
association, fundamental to the fabric of American ideals.137 [F]reedom of speech is
specificallyprotected by the First Amendment, and while freedomof expressive asso-
ciation is not expressly protected, the Supreme Court has noted that its existence is
necessary in making the express guarantees fully meaningful.138 The First Amend-
ments protection does not end at the spoken or written word.139 Rather, an associ-
ations members are entitled to First Amendment protection when that association is
organized for specific expressive purposes.140
Whenever an individual engages in expressive conduct and intends thereby
to express an idea, [the Court has] acknowledged that conduct may be sufficiently
imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments . . . .141 Freedom of association includes the right to express
ones attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or
by other lawful means.142 Freedom of expressive association, then, encompasses an
individuals right to associate with others to pursue a wide array of goals, and those
goals mayextend at least to social, political, educational, economic, cultural, and reli-
gious objectives.143 Specifically, freedom to associate with others for the common
See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); N.Y. State Club Assn v. City of
New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
137 U.S. CONST. amend. I; Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Griswold, 381
U.S. at 483.
138 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
139 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404.
140 N.Y. State Club Assn, 487 U.S. at 13.
141 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)
and United States v. OBrien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)). But see City of Dallas v. Stanglin,
490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every
activity a person undertakes . . . but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within
the protection of the First Amendment.).
142 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483; see also Developments in the Law Immigration and National-
ity, supra note 51, at 723 (Moreover, in view of the very broad statutory definition of affil-
iation it may be an unconstitutional encroachment on the right to freedom of political thought.).
143 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Intl v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987); Griswold,
381 U.S. at 483; see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 61718 (Our decisions have referred to con-
stitutionally protected freedom of association in two distinct senses. In one line of decisions,
the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relation-
ships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such rela-
tionships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.
In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal
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advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form of orderly group activity protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.144
The Court acknowledges that [e]ffective advocacy of both public and private
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association. . . .145 While freedom of association is not absolute,146 freedom from state
intrusion into group association may be indispensable to preservation of freedom of
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.147 As Justice
Holmes originally stated in dissent in 1929, if there is any principle of the Consti-
tution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of
free thoughtnot free thought for those who agree with us, but freedom for the thought
that we hate.148
The Court held in Texas v. Johnson149 that, [i]n deciding whether particular
conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment
into play, a court must ask two questions: first, whether [a]n intent to convey a par-
ticularized message was present; and second, whether the likelihood was great that
the message would be understood by those who viewed it.150 If association with a
particular group satisfies these two requirements, state action which may have the
effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.151 Such
a regulation may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state inter-
ests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas that cannot be achieved through means sig-
nificantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.152 A law that infringes on the
right of expression or association must survive strict scrutiny, which requires the law
liberty. In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose
of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendmentspeech, assembly, petition
for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom
of association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.).
144 Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 5657 (1973).
145 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
146 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
147 Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462.
148 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 138 (1943) (quoting United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
149 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
150 Id. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 41011 (1974)).
151 Patterson, 357 U.S. at 46061; see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (Infringements on that
right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to
the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive
of associational freedoms.).
152 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; see also Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom
of Association: Data Protections vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 138687
(2012). Notehowever, that the language through means significantly less restrictive is a depar-
ture from the traditional strict scrutiny standard of least restrictive means, and perhaps does
not require the government to exhaust every possible means of furthering its interest. See
Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 105 (2d Cir. 2007).
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be narrowly tailored to address only the governments specific interest.153 The speech
and expressive association prohibited by § 1451(c) deserves First Amendment protec-
tion under the Texas v. Johnson test such that the statute does not satisfy strict scrutiny.
Accordingly, the provision is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
a. Membership in, and Advocacy For, the Groups Listed in § 1424(a) Is
Deserving of First Amendment Protection for All Citizens
Under the test laid out in Texas v. Johnson, one must ask whether [a]n intent to
convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.154 Because member-
ship in, and advocacy for, the groups described in § 1424(a), such as the Communist
Party, satisfies this test, § 1451(c) is subject to strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court
held in Kusper v. Pontikes155 that advancement of political beliefs and ideas is
protected by the First Amendment.156 At a minimum, association with the groups listed
in § 1424(a)(1)(3) (communist and totalitarian groups) warrants First Amendment
strict scrutiny.
Irrespective of the holding in Kusper, membership in a § 1424(a) group is intended
to convey a particularized message. Courts have looked to the individuals actual intent
in this inquiry.157 In most cases, it would seem apparent that an individual intends to
help convey an associations message upon joining such association. An individual
joins a communist organization or espouses a totalitarian viewpoint because he wishes
to convey that organizations particularized message. Accordingly, the first prong of
the Texas v. Johnson test is satisfied.
Second, there is a great likelihood that others would understand what message an
individual is attempting to conveywhen he joins an organization. Typicallywhen one
learns that an individual is involved with an organization, one naturally assumes that
the individual is intending to further the message of such organization.158 Thus, the
second prong is also satisfied. Because membership in, and advocacy for, the groups
described in § 1424(a) satisfies the Texas v. Johnson test, § 1451(c) serves as a con-
duct regulation that is subject to First Amendment strict scrutiny.
153 Lizabeth N. De Vries, Guilt By Association: Proposition 21s Gang Conspiracy Law
Will Increase Youth Violence in California, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 191, 203 (2002).
154 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 41011 (1974))
(alteration in original).
155 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
156 Id. at 5657.
157 Joshua Waldman, Note, Symbolic Speech and Social Meaning, 97 COLUM.L.REV. 1844,
1849 (1997).
158 See Blake E. Ashforth & Fred Mael, Social Identity Theory and the Organization, 14
ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 20, 2122 (1989).
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b. The Prohibitions in § 1451(c) Do Not Survive First Amendment Strict
Scrutiny
i. The Asserted Governmental Interests Behind § 1451(c) Are
Not Compelling
Section 1451(c) codifies civil penalties for group membership in particular
organizations or advocacy of certain viewpoints during the five-year period after natu-
ralization, and states that such membership or advocacy is prima facie evidence that the
individual was unfit for citizenship.159 Onlya compelling governmental interest could
possibly justify this restraint on speech, conduct, and association. Because the panoply
of possible governmental interests behind § 1451(c) are not compelling, § 1451(c)
fails strict scrutinyand is an unlawful conduct regulation under the First Amendment.
From the terms of § 1451(c) (and by implication, § 1424), two governmental
interests appear to be at the forefront: prevention of naturalization fraud and prevent-
ing affiliation with, or advocacy for, certain groups.160 The federal government likely
has a compelling interest in preventing naturalization fraud, as it similarly does in
preventing advocacy for the overthrow of the U.S. government by force, the unlaw-
ful assault or killing of United States officers, unlawful destruction of property, and
sabotage.161 However, a court is unlikely to hold that preventing advocacy for com-
munist or totalitarian teachings, or opposition to organized government, are compel-
ling governmental interests.162
Minimizing the spread of communist and totalitarian views is likely not a compel-
ling interest like it may have been during the Cold War when § 1451(c) and § 1424(a)
were enacted.163 Accordingly, suppression of the views named in § 1424(a)(1)(3) does
not present a compelling governmental interest that can justify the § 1451(c) group
membership presumption. Because these interests are not compelling, the government
maynot restrain freedom of speech or association to combat these statutorilydesignated
evils. Even assuming suppression of the views and conduct listed in § 1424(a)(4)(6)
and the prevention of naturalization fraud are compelling governmental interests,
159 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (2012).
160 Id.
161 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a)(4)(6) (2012). For purposes of this Article, we assume that such
advocacy would violate the test set forth for speech advocating violence or unlawful action,
althoughthat point maybe debated. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ([T]he con-
stitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to in-
citing or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.).
162 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a)(1)(3) (2012).
163 STEEL, supra note 46, at § 1:2 (The Immigration and Nationality Act, and others enacted
in the same time period, reflected the times, and particularly incorporated the fear and threat of
Communism.). See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1
(1961) (describing the governments interest in preventing advocacy for communist groups).
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§ 1451(c)s restraint on speech and association is not unrelated to the suppression of
ideas and can be achieved through means significantly less restrictive.
ii. Section 1451(c)s Restraint on Speech and Expressive Association Is Not
Unrelated to the Suppression of Ideas
The Supreme Court stated in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees164 that such a regulation on
speech or association must be unrelated to the suppression of ideas.165 On its face,
§ 1451(c), by incorporating § 1424(a), is intended to suppress ideas.166 Section 1424(a)
suppresses teachings of totalitarianism, communism, and governmental overthrow,
among other ideas.167 Solely for this reason then, § 1451(c) fails First Amendment
strict scrutiny. Moreover, § 1451(c) cannot survive constitutional muster because it is
wholly intended to suppress ideas.
iii. Any Asserted Governmental Interest Can Be Achieved Through
Significantly Less Restrictive Means
Lastly, § 1451(c) fails First Amendment strict scrutiny because significantly less
restrictive means exist to further any arguably compelling governmental interest.
Section 1451(c) acts as a presumption that if, within five years after attaining citizen-
ship, a person becomes a member in a group in which previous membership would
have precluded him from naturalizing when he was a legal permanent resident, such
membership would show that the person was not attached to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States . . . .168 The U.S. government could then pursue
denaturalization solely on that basis.169 Aside from the inherent fallacy of this argu-
ment, such a presumption would obviously not be necessary in the large majority of
cases to show that an individual lacked attachment to the U.S. Constitution at the time
of naturalization. In cases where evidence of post-naturalization membership is neces-
sary to prove its case, the non-existence of corroborating evidence should be a strong
indication that such membership or advocacy only began after naturalization, and thus,
denaturalization is inappropriate.
While the § 1451(c) presumption certainly makes the governments task of
denaturalizing some individuals easier, the First Amendment does not permit the
164 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
165 Id. at 623.
166 8 U.S.C. §§ 1451(c), 1424(a) (2012) (providing civil penalties for anyone who advocates
or teaches, or who is a member of or affiliated with anyorganization that advocates or teaches,
opposition to all organized government; or [numerous other organizations], and also for anyone
who advocates the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism
or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship).
167 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a) (2012).
168 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (2012).
169 Id.
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State to sacrifice speech for efficiency,170 nor should it excuse investigatorial laziness.
The government possesses several mechanisms to prevent naturalization fraud and to
prevent advocacy of ideas the government has a compelling interest in silencing. For
example, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) could further inves-
tigate whether a candidate for citizenship is actually attached to the principles of the
United States Constitution before it grants citizenship.171
The government could also use all the other civil litigation tools it normally has in
its arsenal, including discovery, to satisfy its evidentiary burden for denaturalization.
There is at least one other substantial means of furthering its interestinitiating denat-
uralization under § 1451(a), which has no statute of limitations.172 Relying on § 1451(c)
membership is surplusage to § 1451(a), because § 1451(c)s presumption is just evi-
dence of fraud. Instead of exploring significantly less restrictive alternatives (one of
which would reduce naturalization fraud in the first place and decrease the need for
denaturalization altogether; another of which the government has relied on countless
times to denaturalize citizens),173 the government has sacrificed First Amendment pro-
tection in the name of expedience. For this reason alone, § 1451(c) fails strict scrutiny.
Finally, § 1451(c) is overbroad in that it incorporates § 1424(a)s listed groups and
ideologies, which is fatal under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that
regulation on free speech, even in areas subject to government regulation, may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms.174 The government may not use an overbroad regulation when
the end can be more narrowly achieved.175 A regulation will not be found unconstitu-
tionally overbroad unless it is real and substantial.176 Section 1451(c) is both. By incor-
porating the prohibitions in § 1424(a), an individual could face civil liability for any
level of membership or affiliation with groups such as a communist or totalitarian
party.177 Such a prohibition would seemingly include anyone who is involved with
170 Riley v. Natl Fedn of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988).
171 Note, however, that USCISs investigatory arm, the Fraud Detection and National Security
Directorate, is a fees-based agency, so any increased investigation during the naturalization pro-
cess will likely lead to an increased N-400 Application for Naturalization fee, which currently
costs $595. See Form N-400: Instructions for Application for Naturalization, U.S. CITIZEN-
SHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/n-400
instr.pdf. Therefore, any increase in pre-naturalization investigation may require further con-
gressional appropriations.
172 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012); see also Revocation of Citizenship, 21 U.S. Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 44 (O.L.C.), 1997 WL 33101204.
173 See Detroit Area Man Who Shot Jews While Serving as Nazi Policeman Ordered
Removed from the United States, supra note 7.
174 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
175 Id. at 30708 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
176 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
177 8 U.S.C. §§ 1451(c), 1424(a) (2012).
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such organizations in any way. This would include individuals involved with the
organization who do not actually support the organizations viewpoint.178 These regula-
tions do nothing to distinguish between individuals who are involved with advocating
these groups core message, and those who are not. Because it leads to potentially wide-
spread and arbitrary liability, § 1451(c) is unconstitutionally overbroad under the
First Amendment.
The passage of § 1451(c) predates any Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding
freedom of expressive association, and is in serious conflict with those holdings.179
While § 1451(c) is arguably designed to serve compelling governmental interests, its
restrictions on expressive association are wholly aimed at the suppression of ideas,
and the government can further its interests through other significantly less restrictive
means. For these reasons, the governments use of § 1451(c) to interfere with an indi-
viduals rights to free speech and expressive association does not survive strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment.
2. Section 1451(c) Violates the Equal Protection Component of the Fifth
Amendments Due Process Clause
8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) trips on the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendments Due Process Clause because it divides U.S. citizens into classes based
on national origin and provides unequal protection for recently naturalized citizens.
By subjecting some citizens to a different law, and potentially massive civil penalties
that U.S. citizens bybirth do not face, § 1451(c) deprives naturalized citizens of equal
protection of the law. Because § 1451(c) cannot survive strict scrutiny under the Fifth
Amendments equal protection component, it is facially unconstitutional under the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
[T]he Constitution neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.180 Of
particular importance, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that, aside from the
constitutionally proscribed eligibility to be President, rights of citizenship of the na-
tive born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity and are coextensive.181
178 However, some argue that because this evidence will only result in denaturalization in
the absence of countervailing evidence . . . [§ 1451(c)] does not, therefore, chill association that
legitimately arises after naturalization. Price v. INS, 941 F.2d 878, 885 n.8 (9th Cir. 1991)
(this opinion was later withdrawnand superseded). But see Hooker, supra note 44, at 378 (To
the extent § 1451(c) chills free speech for those recently naturalized, it makes naturalized citi-
zens into second class citizens and is therefore potentially unconstitutional.).
179 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (2012) (enacted in 1952), with Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (decided in 1958). The Supreme Court later added to its expressive association juris-
prudence. See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); N.Y. State Club Assn v.
City of NewYork, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
180 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
181 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22
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Because § 1451(c) divides U.S. citizens into classes and provides unequal protection
among those classes, this provision is unconstitutional under existing Supreme Court
equal protection analysis.
Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment which is applicable to the states, the Fifth
Amendment does not expressly contain an Equal Protection Clause that is applicable
to federal government action.182 However, the Supreme Court has applied a theory of
reverse incorporation to hold that the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause con-
tains an equal protection component that prevents the federal government from dis-
criminating between individuals or groups.183 Equal protection analysis is the same
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.184
The portions of equal protection analysis that are relevant here are as follows
generally, legislation is presumed valid if rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.185 The general rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race,
alienage, or national origin.186 Because such laws are considered to reflect prejudice
and antipathy, and are seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
interest, they are subject to strict scrutiny.187 Similar to First Amendment strict scru-
tiny, such laws are given the most exacting scrutiny, and the burden falls on the gov-
ernment to show that its laws are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.188 Because § 1451(c) classifies citizens by national origin, it
is subject to strict scrutiny, and since it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest, it is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment.
Section 1451(c) necessarilyclassifies citizens on the basis of national origin. The
provision creates two classes of citizens: those who originated in the United States, and
those who did not.189 Naturalized citizens are relegated to second-class citizenship.190
(1913); see also Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 83435 (1971) (quoting Schneider v. Rusk,
but noting that naturalization, when unlawfully procured, may be set aside).
182 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
183 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). See generally Bradford Russell Clark,
Note, Judicial Reviewof Congressional Section Five Action: The Fallacy of Reverse Incorpo-
ration, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1969 (1984).
184 Adarand Constructors, Inc.v.Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217 (1995); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
185 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
186 Id.
187 Id. ([R]ace, alienage, or national origin . . . are so seldom relevant to the achievement
of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathya view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving
as others. For these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by
legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny . . . .).
188 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S.499, 505 (2005); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461
(1988); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
189 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (2012).
190 See Hooker, supra note 44, at 377 (noting that § 1451(c) chills speech for those recently
naturalized and thereby creates second-class citizenship). Some believe that the threat of
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For those citizens that did not originate in the United Statesnaturalized citizensthe
law provides for a potential civil penalty for certain forms of speech and association
within five years of naturalization. Conversely, U.S. citizens who were born into their
citizenship are free to engage in that same speech and association without a similar
risk.191 Though the Supreme Court has never explicitlyheld that naturalized citizens are
a suspect class, the Court has held that nationality is a suspect class.192 On its face,
§ 1451(c) classifies U.S. citizens based on original national origin and discriminates
against those citizens who originated outside the United States. Therefore, unless this
provision is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest, it is uncon-
stitutional under the Fifth Amendment.193
As explained above in Part II.A.1.b, some of the governmental interests behind
§ 1451(c), and byincorporation, § 1424(a), arenot compelling. The federal government
has no interest, let alone a compelling interest, in suppressing free speech, conduct, and
association in groups that advocate unpopular views. Such goals cannot support the
dual classifications created by § 1451(c). And though the government may have a com-
pelling interest in preventing naturalization fraud and in preventing the types of advo-
cacy described in § 1424(a)(4)(6), the statutory basis chosen to further those interests
are not narrowly tailored and necessary to achieve these goals.
Section 1451(c) is not likely to prevent the advocacy of certain views contained in
§ 1424(a)(4)(6). The Supreme Court has held that a regulation subject to strict scru-
tiny will not be upheld if it could have been achieved by less restrictive means.194 As
described in Part II.A.1.b.iii, if the government trulywanted to prevent naturalization
fraud, it could be more diligent in its pre-naturalization investigation and screening pro-
cesses. This would lower the incidence of naturalization fraud and reduce the need for
denaturalization in the first place. The government is also free to use every other tool
in its civil litigation arsenal to meet its burden of proof. The government may not sac-
rifice constitutional freedoms simply because using other methods to build a strong
case may be more difficult.195 Because a naturalized citizens associations after nat-
uralization have no relevant bearing on his frame of mind when he naturalized, this
measure is not likely to serve the intended end. Accordingly, § 1451(c) is not necessary,
denaturalization generally makes naturalized citizens into second-class citizens. See Knauer
v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 676 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); WEIL, supra note 78,
at 158; Jon B. Hultman, Note, Administrative Denaturalization: Is There Nothing You Can
Do That Cant be [Un]done?, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 895, 926 (2001).
191 Knauer, 328 U.S. at 676 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
192 See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971); Hultman, supra note 190, at 926.
193 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (holding that when a statute classifies by race, alien-
age, or national origin, it is subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if [it is]
suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest (emphasis added)).
194 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 11718 n.15 (1980).
195 Riley v. Natl Fedn of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988).
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or even likely, to prevent naturalization fraud. Rather, it remains a dangerous vestigial
statute from the Cold War era.
Next, under the Equal Protection Clause, a statutory classification must not be
arbitrary.196 Section 1451(c) is arbitrary in at least two ways. First, it sets an arbitrary
limit of five years after naturalization as the cutoff point where naturalized citizens may
engage in the proscribed conduct without fear of a presumption of detachment to the
principles of the U.S. Constitution at the time of naturalization. If a naturalized citi-
zen espouses communist views four years and eleven months after gaining citizenship,
that conduct is prima facie evidence that he was not attached to the principles of the
U.S. Constitution when he naturalized.197 If another naturalized citizen engages in
the same conduct five years and one day after naturalization, no prima facie case is
established.198 Thus, absent any other evidence, the former individual could be denatu-
ralized while the latter would not be denaturalized, even if the latter was the only one
of the two individuals to have actually obtained his citizenship unlawfully. Such a
five-year limit creates an arbitrary presumption, and is unconstitutional.
Section 1451(c) arbitrarily determines that the proscribed conduct is only severe
enough to subject a certain class of U.S. citizens to potential civil penalties. Yet, prac-
tically and constitutionally, naturalized citizens as a class are not less trustworthy or
reliable than the native-born.199 If this is the case, then § 1451(c)s distinction between
naturalized citizens and U.S.-born citizens must be deemed arbitrary. The statute
creates an unlawful arbitrary distinction between classes and is therefore unconsti-
tutional under equal protection analysis.
Section 1451(c) divides U.S. citizens into two classes and provides unequal
protection for recentlynaturalized U.S. citizens. Such adistinction is subject to the most
exacting form of review possible, and § 1451(c) is unable to survive strict scrutiny
under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause.
Because the regulation is not narrowly tailored or necessary to serve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest and is arbitrary, it is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment.
3. Section 1451(c) Is a Classic Example of Over-Penalization of
Innocent Conduct
Although denaturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1451 is a civil cause of action,200 it
bears much resemblance to a criminal proceeding. In addition to the heightened eviden-
tiary burden (clear, unequivocal, and convincing),201 which the Seventh Circuit Court
196 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
197 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (2012).
198 Id.
199 Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 525 n.14 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
200 United States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374, 1382 (7th Cir. 1986) (Denaturalization is a civil
rather than criminal proceeding.); Jay L. Chavkin, Note and Comment, The Man Without a
Country: The Just Deserts of John Demjanjuk, 28 LOY.L.A.L.REV. 769, 770 (1995) (A denat-
uralization proceeding is a civil hearing in equity . . . .).
201 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943).
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of Appeals described as contemplating a higher standard of materiality . . . than
does the criminal law generally,202 denaturalization, which likely leads to removal
proceedings, has a retributive element to it that tracks closelywith the criminal law.203
So, while not technicallycriminal, denaturalization proceedings under § 1451(c) pro-
vide such a steep penalty for violation that they may fairly be analogized to criminal
proceedings.204 Just as some criminal laws tend to overcriminalize lawful conduct,
§ 1451(c) similarly tends to over-penalize otherwise innocent conduct.
When critics of a criminal law argue that it overcriminalizes certain conduct, they
tend to argue three points: first, that there is a lack of enforcement which signals that
the conduct is not actually condemned; second, that because there is a lack of enforce-
ment, there arises a substantial possibility of discriminatory enforcement; and third,
that law enforcement resources are diverted from more important goals in order to
criminalize innocent conduct. Section 1451(c) carries with it all of these familiar char-
acteristics, and therefore should be eliminated from the current immigration law.205
Section 1451(c) suffers fromanear total lackof enforcement. Denaturalizations are
rare in general, and denaturalization under § 1451(c) is almost never implemented.206
This can cause confusion as to whether the conduct is actually considered unlawful. In
fact, the moral message communicated by the law is contradicted by the total ab-
sence of enforcement; for while the public sees the conduct condemned in words, it
also sees in the dramatic absence of prosecutions that it is not condemned in deed.207
202 United States v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1305 (9th Cir. 1992)).
203 John William Heath, Jr., Note, Journey Over Strange Ground: From Demjanjuk to
the International Criminal Court Regime, 13 GEO. IMMIGR.L.J. 383, 385 (1999) (discussing
the blurring of the distinctions between the civil and criminal systems in denaturalization);
Chavkin, supra note 200, at 792 n.201 (stripping an individual of citizenship, deporting him
to an unfamiliar country, and causing him to lose dailycontact with his family and friends seems
retributive enough to be considered punishment . . . .).
204 Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 160 (A denaturalization suit is not a criminal proceeding. But
neither is it an ordinary civil action since it involves an important adjudication of status.).
205 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcrminalization: From Morals and
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM.U.L.REV. 747, 76667 (2005); Sanford H. Kadish,
The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 AM.CRIM.L.Q. 17 (1968); Jeffrey S. Parker, Developing
Consensus on Solutions to Overcriminalization Problems: The Way Ahead, 7 J.L. ECON. &
POLY 725, 726 (2011); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645 (1996) (describing anti-
sodomy statutes as overcriminalization, the Court opined that enforcement could be accom-
plished only by the most wasteful allocation of law enforcement resources).
206 Hooker, supra note 44, at 343, 362 (Since Price, appellate courts have not heard any
cases in which § 1451(c) has been at issue. . . . Section 1451(c) has rarely been invoked. It has
never been successfully relied on to denaturalize a citizen.); see also Elizabeth Keys, Defining
American: The Dream Act, Immigration Reform and Citizenship, 14 NEV.L.J. 101, 155 (2013);
Arnold Rochvarg, Report to the Administrative ConferenceReforming the Administrative
Naturalization Process: Reducing Delays While Increasing Fairness, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
397, 446 (1995).
207 Kadish, supra note 205, at 20.
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Such confusion can lead to an actual impairment of individual security, which is
precisely the opposite of what the law is supposed to accomplish.208 Further, deploy-
ment of the criminal sanction for behavior that seems harmless or unworthy of public
censure tends to weaken the moral force of criminal law.209 By retaining the power to
enforce where no enforcement actually occurs, the state keeps individuals in a state of
insecurity that tends to deprive the law of its normal force.
Next, the near total lack of enforcement under § 1451(c) leads to an unacceptably
high risk of discriminatory enforcement. There is serious potential for corruption and
discrimination when the criminal law exceeds its limits.210 Section 1451(c) leaves total
discretion to U.S. Attorneys to initiate denaturalization, and invites discriminatory
enforcement against persons selected for prosecution on grounds unrelated to the evil
against which these laws are purportedly addressed.211 It is easy to imagine a U.S.
Attorney targeting certain individuals for membership in a group with which he dis-
agrees, or even simply using the provisions of § 1451(c) to initiate denaturalization
proceedings for reasons entirelyunrelated to association with that group. Another risk
includes the enhanced opportunities created for extortionary threats of exposure and
prosecution.212 The better course would be to eliminate the possibility of this in-
creased risk of extortion and discrimination.
Third, § 1451(c) may divert law enforcement resources from other more impor-
tant government objectives. Societys interest in effective law enforcement suffers
if the government channels its resources on the basis of prejudice or other improper
motives.213 Section 1451(c) could potentially divert substantial resources from areas
that may prove to be tomorrows problems.214 By focusing police attention on whether
recently naturalized citizens are members of certain groups, § 1451(c) sidetracks law
enforcement officials from other tasks, including ensuring that naturalization fraud
is not occurring prior to naturalization. [T]he decision to criminalize any particular
behavior must follow only after an assessment and balancing of gains and losses.215
When the governments costs and benefits are weighed, it becomes clear that § 1451(c)
does not pass such a balancing test.
208 Id. at 20 (Dead letter laws, far from promoting a sense of security, which is the main
function of the penal law, actually impair that security by holding the threat of prosecution over
the heads of people whom we have no intention to punish. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 207.11, comments at 151 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959))).
209 Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM.U. L.REV. 703, 729 (2005).
210 Douglas N. Husak, TheNature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate Offenses, 37 ARIZ.
L. REV. 151, 152 (1995).
211 Kadish, supra note 205, at 21.
212 Id.
213 Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing
Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1088 (1997).
214 Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Crime and the Recession: Was the Chicken or the Egg
First?, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205, 222 (2010).
215 Kadish, supra note 205, at 33.
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Although a civil law proceeding, denaturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1451 bears
many similarities to criminal law proceedings. In addition to requiring a heightened
evidentiary showing and providing for the devastating penalty of loss of citizenship,
denaturalization under § 1451(c) possesses many of the same characteristics of crim-
inal laws that tend to overcriminalize behavior.216 § 1451(c) is a classic example of a
law that overcriminalizes conduct because it suffers from a near-total lack of enforce-
ment, tends to encourage discriminatory enforcement, and diverts scarce government
resources. For these reasons alone, Congress should excise 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) from
immigration law.
B. Procedural Areas for Amendment of the Denaturalization Statute
The substantive concerns of the denaturalization process are significant, but pro-
cedural concerns in the statute also deserve legislative attention. Congress should act
to consolidate the sole power to initiate denaturalization proceedings with the Attorney
General, and also codify the evidentiary burden required for denaturalization.
1. Power to the Attorney General
One major procedural flaw in the current denaturalization procedure is the
division of authority in the United States government for initiating a denaturalization
proceeding. As the historical development of denaturalization proceedings which
eventually led to 8 U.S.C. § 1451 shows, Congress changed the operating procedure
more than once.217 There is an inconsistency in the proper division of authority between
the Attorney General and the numerous United States Attorneys spread out across
the country.218
In the initial development of United States Attorneys, Assistant U.S. Attorneys,
while appointed by the Attorney General, were not under his direct control.219 Begin-
ning in 1966, 28 U.S.C. § 519 provided the Attorney General the responsibility to
direct all United States attorneys [and] assistant United States attorneys . . . in the
discharge of their respective duties.220 Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 516 provides that
216 Id. at 1921, 30.
217 WEIL, supra note 78, at 41 (noting that between 1922 and 1926, a compromise was
reached that vested denaturalization power in the Department of Justice, although denaturali-
zations would be handled exclusively by U.S. Attorneys, subject to DOJ approval).
218 U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL § 3-2.400 (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao
/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title3/2musa.htm (The division of responsibility in theDepart-
ment of Justice between the offices of the United States Attorneys and the legal divisions is de-
termined by statutes, Code of Federal Regulations provisions, Attorney General and Deputy
Attorney General directives, and actual practice. It is also extensively discussed in the Manuals
various titles.); see also Koolstra v. Sullivan, 128 F.R.D. 672, 673 (D. Colo. 1989).
219 Koolstra, 128 F.R.D. at 673.
220 28 U.S.C. § 519 (2012).
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the conduct of litigation in which the United States . . . is a party . . . is reserved to
officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.221
Even though this language seems to provide a clear direction that the Attorney General
shall direct the conduct of all U.S. Attorneys and Assistant U.S. Attorneys, there are
still areas of the law in which the division of authority is not particularly clear.222
In the context of naturalization, 8 U.S.C. § 1421 provides direct control and sole
authority to the Attorney General.223 For example, § 1421(a) provides that [t]he
sole authority to naturalize persons as citizens of the United States is conferred upon
the Attorney General.224 This power includes the ability to issue certificates of
naturalization225 and to forward information to the court necessary to administer the
oath of allegiance.226 These provisions provide the AttorneyGeneral clear and exclu-
sive authority over naturalization proceedings.
Yet once an individual is potentially subject to denaturalization, the Attorney
General and U.S. Attorneys roles and authority become less clear. Under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1451(a), United States Attorneys have a duty, upon a finding of good cause to be-
lieve that an order of naturalization and certificate of naturalization were illegally
procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepre-
sentation, to provide an affidavit to a district court which will initiate revocation of
the order granting naturalization and lead to cancellation of the individuals certif-
icate of naturalization.227 However, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(h) provides the AttorneyGeneral
with the power to correct, reopen, alter, modify, or vacate an order naturalizing the
person.228 The result appears to be that United States Attorneys have individual au-
thority, concurrent with that of the Attorney General, to pursue actions of denaturaliza-
tion without explicit direction from the Attorney General.
And as noted in Part I.A, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) provides that membership or
affiliation in the proscribed groups within five years of naturalization is sufficient to
form a prima facie case of denaturalization in the proper proceeding to authorize the
revocation and setting aside of the order admitting such person to citizenship and the
cancellation of the certificate of naturalization as having been obtained byconcealment
221 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012); see also Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 134041 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General of the United States supervises
all litigation to which the United States or an agency thereof is a party.).
222 Koolstra, 128 F.R.D. at 673 (The division of labor between attorneys in the Department
of Justice and U.S. Attorneys is not altogether clear.).
223 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (2012). Note that this authority has been delegated to the Department of
Homeland Security in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended. See Homeland Security
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 §§ 441, 451 (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 251, 271 (2012)).
224 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (2012).
225 8 U.S.C. § 1421(b)(4) (2012).
226 8 U.S.C. § 1421(b)(2)(A)(ii)(i) (2012).
227 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012).
228 8 U.S.C. § 1451(h) (2012).
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of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.229 [I]n the proper proceeding
would seem to include denaturalization actions initiated by the Attorney General under
§ 1451(h) and by U.S. Attorneys under § 1451(a). As in all denaturalization proceed-
ings, but particularly in § 1451(c) proceedings, a zealous U.S. Attorney may use his
power in ways not contemplated or intended by the law.230 Instead of centralizing
the power structure under the AttorneyGeneral to develop a consistent and evenhanded
application of denaturalization laws, Congress, by developing the procedure for denat-
uralization proceedings over the span of 100-plus years, has haphazardly left open the
question of the proper division of authority for initiating denaturalization between the
Attorney General and U.S. Attorneys.
In Thomas v. INS,231 the Ninth Circuit expressed its view on the existing division
of authority in denaturalizations proceedings.232 In a case regarding whether a plea bar-
gain promised by an Assistant U.S. Attorney bound the United States even though
the Assistant U.S. Attorney had no such explicit power, the court noted that Congress
expressly assigned overlapping authority to both the Attorney General and to United
States Attorneys.233 The court further noted that Congress has spread out power
instead of concentrating it all at the center.234 Thomas demonstrates the fact that,
not only are courts unclear on the proper division of authority between the Attorney
General and U.S. Attorneys in denaturalization proceedings, but the U.S. Attorneys
themselves may also be confused as to their roles and powers.
The proper solution is to centralize all power to initiate denaturalization proceed-
ings in the Attorney General. Providing the Attorney General the sole authority to com-
mence such proceedings would serve at least three important goals: clarifying for U.S.
Attorneys, judges, and the public who exactly is responsible for initiating denaturaliza-
tion actions; making the Attorney General actually responsible for the conduct of
U.S. Attorneys, as outlined in 28 U.S.C. §§ 516 and 519; and ensuring that denatural-
ization proceedings are only initiated in cases where cause is clearly shown, which will
reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of U.S. citizens rights.
Thomas demonstrates that U.S. Attorneys, courts, and individuals subject to de-
naturalization proceedings are unclear on the proper scope of authority of U.S. Attor-
neysin denaturalization proceedings.235 In Thomas, the U.S. Attorneybelieved he was
authorized to make such a plea bargain, the naturalized individual relied on that
assertion, and the Ninth Circuit expressed its confusion as to whether the U.S. Attorney
229 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (2012).
230 FEC v. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign Commn, 678 F.2d 416, 422 n.15 (2d Cir. 1982)
(Many of the denaturalization statutes may be used in the future by a zealous prosecutor.).
231 35 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1994).
232 Thomas dealt with criminal denaturalization statutes, but the courts analysis remains
relevant.
233 Thomas, 35 F.3d at 1339.
234 Id.
235 See id.
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had that authority.236 Centralizing power in the Attorney General to make all decisions
regarding the initiation of denaturalization proceedings will substantially eliminate
confusion in this area of immigration law.
Codifying exclusive authority to initiate denaturalizing proceedings with the
Attorney General will also further the mandates set out for the Attorney General in
28 U.S.C. §§ 516 and 519. These sections state that the Attorney General must direct
all United States attorneys . . . in the discharge of their respective duties,237 and the
provisions ensure that all conduct during litigation in which the U.S. is a party is under
the direction of the Attorney General.238 The current division of power, in effect, dis-
obeys these commands. Providing the Attorney General with exclusive authority in
this area will ensure that he remains in control of the conduct of all U.S. Attorneys
during litigation.
Finally, placing exclusive power to initiate denaturalization proceedings in the
hands of the Attorney General will serve as an important check on use of the ex-
traordinary remedy of denaturalization. As the Second Circuit has noted, a zealous
prosecutor could use the existing balance of power to trample on the rights of U.S.
citizens.239 The Supreme Court has stated that the rights of naturalized citizens are
coequal with those of natural-born citizens.240 Congress should be hesitant to retain the
current division of authority that provides U.S. Attorneys clear opportunity to violate
the fundamental rights of naturalized citizens, especially when the potential result is
a loss of the right to citizenship itself. By centralizing the decision to denaturalize an
individual with the AttorneyGeneral, naturalized citizens will be more secure in their
rights and will likely face a lower risk of having their rights arbitrarily deprived.
The existing division of power in the denaturalization context creates confusion,
removes exclusive authority and responsibility for the conduct of U.S. Attorneys from
the hands of the Attorney General, and provides too large a possibility that U.S. citi-
zens rights will be arbitrarily violated. To counter these evils and meaningfully protect
the fundamental rights of all U.S. citizens, Congress should amend the denaturaliza-
tion law to provide sole authority to initiate denaturalization proceedings with the
Attorney General.
2. Codifying the Evidentiary Burden Required for Denaturalization
In 1943, the Supreme Court determined in Schneiderman that a certificate of
citizenship may not be revoked unless the evidence supporting such denaturalization
236 See id.
237 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1948).
238 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1948).
239 FEC v. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign Commn, 678 F.2d 416, 422 n.15 (2d Cir. 1982).
240 Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946) (noting that citizenship by natural-
ization carries with it all of the rights and prerogatives of citizenship obtained by birth in
this country.).
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is clear, unequivocal, and convincing.241 It determined that a certificate of citizenship
is an instrument granting political privileges, and open like other public grants to
be revoked if and when it shall be found to have been unlawfully or fraudulently
procured.242 The Court noted that a certificate of citizenship is similar to a public
grant of land, and therefore revocation of citizenship, like revocation of other public
grants, could not be accomplished by a preponderance of the evidence, or upon evi-
dence which leaves the issue in doubt.243
Although the Supreme Court issued the Schneiderman decision before Congress
enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Congress did not codify the com-
mon law standard of clear, unequivocal, and convincing into the INA,244 nor did it
codify any evidentiary burden for denaturalization proceedings.245 The Supreme Court
continues to use the clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard.246 This is an appro-
priate standard, given the fundamental individual rights that may be adjudicated in a
denaturalization proceeding, and the lack of familiarity a judge may have with a denat-
uralization proceeding.247 To provide legislative clarity, Congress should codify the
Supreme Courts evidentiary standard of clear, unequivocal, and convincing.
Failure to codify this standard could have two negative effects. First, a district
court judge may inadvertently apply a lower evidentiary standard, leading to an erro-
neous denaturalization and needless appellate review. The tremendous hardship an
incorrect adjudication would cause a denaturalized citizen justifies codification of
the standard. Next, if Congress were to codify an evidentiary burden lower than clear,
unequivocal, and convincing, such a standard could present confusion in the lower
courts and would likelybe held unconstitutional under existing precedent. Therefore,
to provide judicial clarity and minimize the possibility of a denaturalization proceed-
ing occurring under a lower evidentiary burden, Congress should codify the clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidentiary standard for denaturalization proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The fundaments of civil denaturalization balance twopropositions.Oneproposition
suggests that the government must hold all naturalized persons accountable for their
pre-naturalization character and actions. It is on this basis that the government may
241 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943).
242 Id. (quoting Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 238 (1912)).
243 Id. (quoting United States v. Maxwell Land-Grant Co., 121 U.S. 325, 381 (1887)).
244 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
245 See id.
246 See Maisenberg v. United States, 356 U.S. 670, 673 (1958) (using the Schneiderman
evidentiary standard just four years after enactment of the INA of 1952); see also Kungys v.
United States., 485 U.S. 759 (1988); Mary C. Stakun, Materiality in the Denaturalization
Context: Kungys v. United States, 23 CORNELL INTL L.J. 161, 16364 (1990).
247 See Keys, supra note 206, at 155; Rochvarg, supra note 206, at 446.
2015] SNAP: THE MORAL ELASTICITY 673
lawfully revoke citizenship unlawfully procured. The second proposition is that
citizens, whether naturalized or by birth, are entitled to equivalent rights and treat-
ment because the rights of naturalized citizens are coequal with those of natural-born
citizens.248 The second proposition is discarded by § 1451(c)s five-year period after
naturalization during which a person must not affiliate with certain groups, under threat
of potentially losing his citizenship. Such a probationary period flies against the free-
doms that every U.S. citizen is entitled to under the United States Constitution.
Many aspects of the current denaturalization law are in dire need of amendment.
8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) should be stricken entirely from immigration law, the Attorney
General should be vested with the exclusive power to initiate denaturalization proceed-
ings, and the evidentiary burden to revoke citizenship should be codified. Failure to
address these three topics will encourage confusion in the law and facilitate potential
future constitutional violations.
Section 1451(c)s group membership provision trips upon the constitutional rights
of naturalized citizens in two ways: by violating their fundamental rights of freedom
of speech and association under the First Amendment and by depriving them of equal
protection of the law under the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause. Moreover,
§ 1451(c) offends public policybyover-penalizing innocent conduct, therebymaking
naturalized citizens less secure than other American citizens.
The Attorney General and United States Attorneys appear to have equal individual
authority to initiate denaturalization proceedings.249 This creates confusion among
U.S. Attorneys, judges, and individuals. Also, the current division of authorityallows
for discriminatory enforcement of denaturalization laws and makes it so that the Attor-
ney General is not actually responsible for the conduct of all U.S. Attorneys. Accord-
ingly, Congress should consolidate exclusive authority to initiate denaturalization
proceedings in the Attorney General.
Finally, Congress should act to codify the common law evidentiary burden re-
quired to revoke an individuals citizenship. The Supreme Court has consistently used
the clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence standard since 1943, but Congress
has never acted to codify that standard.250 By doing so, Congress would make the
evidentiary burden clearer for individuals and judges, and remove any possibility
of courts inadvertently using a lower standard. Given the fundamental rights at stake
in a denaturalization proceeding, Congress should act swiftly to provide clarity in this
area of the law.
Legislative history leads to the conclusion that Congress did not comprehend
the scope of denaturalization proceedings or the procedures used. Most proposed
248 Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946) (noting that citizenship by natural-
ization carries with it all of the rights and prerogatives of citizenship obtained by birth in
this country).
249 Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 1994).
250 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943).
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legislation regarding immigration reform is focused on topics such as reducing the
number of persons entering the country without admission or parole, whether to pro-
vide amnesty to those who have already done so, and whether to apply stricter penal-
ties on businesses that hire undocumented workers. However, when Congress emerges
from its torpor and does act, it should revisit the three areas of the law outlined in this
Article§ 1451(c), sole authority to initiatedenaturalization with the AttorneyGeneral,
and codifying the evidentiaryburden for denaturalization. Denaturalization is a small
part of the comprehensive immigration laws, but it has significant consequences for
the individual involved because its successful invocation can undo a lifetime of work
and shatter the American dream.
